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THE WAR IN THE ORIENT IN THE LIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
PART II.
From the Siberian seaport of Vladivostok the Russian
cruiser squadron frequently sallied during the earlier part
of the war, and did considerable damage to the
Problame shipping of .Japan and of neutral nations as
Warte Afo well. Thus, between February and May, 19o4,Secting the
Belligerents
=army. were sunk the Nakonoura Maru, Gozo Maru
and Kinshiu Maru. The first two vessels were
Japanese merchantmen, the last an army transport."
The question at once presents itself as to the right of the
Russians to dispense with the adjudication of a Prize Court
as to the character of the cargoes carried by the captured
ships, and to sink them out of hand. Wheaton says: " If the
vessel belong to the enemy, and the captor has no means of
retaining possession of her, or of bringing herinto port, he is
then justified in destroying her, but it is his duty to preserve
her papers and as much of her cargo as he can secure."' 1
And a little later the following interesting passage occurs
anent the same subject: "During the Russo-Turkish war of
1877 the former'power (Russia) was alleged to have made a
practice of sending out fast steamers from Odessa, which,
while they avoided the Turkish cruisers, captured Turkish
merchantren, burnt them on the spot, and then set the crews
adrift in boats. If this was true, it was an undeniable vio-
lation of international law." 48
One naturally wonders whether Russia has been pursuing
tactics of this kind in the present war? It seems established,
however, that the ships in question were sunk off the coast
The Annual Register, 1904, page 376; War and Neutrality in
The Far East, by T. J. Lawrence, M.A., LL.D., page 40.
4 TWheaton, (4th English ed.) page 5o6.
U Wheaton, page 5o7, where the following references are cited
for the statements made; Parl. Papers, Turkey (No. x), i878, page
313; and The Times, i5 Dec., 1877.
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of Korea at times when their captors .were in imminent dan-
ger of destruction at the hands of a superior Japanese naval
force. They had no time to take the vessels to port, nor
could they spare prize crews to man them. The additional
and distressing fact in the case of the Kinshiu Maru that
a large number of the brave troops she was transporting
sank with her, can hardly be made the basis of a charge
against Russia, it being clear that ample opportunity to sur-
render was given them, and that their refusal was wilful and
apparently because of a foolishly sentimental bravery.
When war is declared between two states there are sure
to be citizens of each in the territory of the other, and ships
belonging to either party in the ports of the
Mritime enery. In the good old days the custom was
wreBel. for a state which contemplated war with another
Sectlng Be.
NZ' to levy an embargo upon all of its adversary's
shipping, which happened to be in port before
the declaration of war, and when that took place to gather
in a rich haul of valuable prizes.'"
To-day, howeve-, the necessities of commerce exercise a
dominating influence over warfare, and such things are man-
aged very differently. Belligerent nations are expected to
give each other's ships a reasonable time to leave port after
war is declared. This period for departure is commonly
known. as " Days of Grace." " In this instance the
Japanese by an Imperial decree issued February 9, 1904,
gave Russian shipping until February 16 to clear from
Japanese ports, and granted protection also to Russian ships
sailing before that date direct for Japan. Such ships were
given permission to discharge cargo and return by a speci-
fied route.51 These regulations could hardly be considered
liberal in comparison with similar rules laid down in other
recent wars; but the privileges granted by Russia were even
more restricted.
"War and Neutrality," Lawrence, page 49.
War and Neutrality, Lawrence, Page 45. For liberal rules
made by U. 8. during the war with Spain, see Eaton's International
Law, page 66.
" See The Japanese Imperial Decree of February 9tb, 19o4.
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Japanese merchantmen in Russian ports at the time war
was declared (February io) were permitted to stay "for
such period as may be necessary in proportion to their load-
ing requirements, but which shall in no case exceed forty-
eight hours, counting from the moment that the present
ileclaration is published by the local authorities." 2
It may be said in passing that the regulations respecting
the citizens of either belligerent residing in the territory of
the other were quite drastic. The Japanese permitted resi-
dence under certain conditions, but the Russians expelled the
Japanese from Manchuria without a day's notice, thus en-
tailing great suffering upon thousands of innocent and un-
offending people."8
The result of the foregoing facts is simhply this: A bel-
ligerent nation may act with great severity towards the com-
merce and non-military population of its enemy which chance
puts in its power at the beginning of a war, without break-
ing any rule of international law. The old theory which we
have never entirely got away from was that everything be-
longing to the enemy which cottld be captured under such
conditions was fair spoil."
To-day, however, two powerful factors militate against
adherence to even amodified form of the old theory, name-
ly, humanity and commercial interest. It touches our hearts
to see such a sight as the flight of the Japanese refugees from
Port Arthur, and it touches our pocket-books to have a
belligerent merchantman, in whose cargo we are interested,
captured in the enemy's port before war has fairly begun.
For these difficulties it seems well to apply the remedy
suggested in other matters. Let the whole question of
"Days of Grace" be settled by the next Hague Conference.
It is of too much importance to neutral states to permit the
continuance of the present methods of determination. It
shoulj1 not be left to the discretion of the belligerents, but
See Art. 2nd, of Rules, which the Imperial Government will
enforce during the War with Japan.
War and Neutrality, Lawrence, page 38."Hall's International Law, pages 391-395."
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should be fixed for all through an universal agreement by all.
Only in this way can the influence of malice and greed be
eliminated, and fair and equable rules be obtained.
It has been a long time since there have been so many ap-
parently flagrant breaches of the neutrality of harbors be-
longing to non-belligerents as have occurred in
Naval Opra. the late conflict. This, of course, was largely
tions In Net-
tt atirbors due to the fact that both China and Korea were
far too weak to maintain perfect neutrality, and
the belligerents fell into the habit of treating their territory
as personal property.
To turn to a case in point: On the day the war began
(February 8, 19o4) a Japanese fleet under Admiral Uriu
steamed into the harbor of Chemulpo, Korea, where the Rus-
sian cruiser Variag and her consort, the gunboat Korietz,
were anchored. The Japanese commander at once informed
the Russians that they must leave the harbor at once and
fight at sea, or he would attack them within the port.5
Then occurred what has since achieved considerable
notoriety, namely, "The Protest of the Three Captains."
It happened that at this time the following men-of-war
were also in Chdmulpo harbor, the Talbot (British), Vicks-
burg (American), Pascal (French), and Elba (Italian).
The captains of all these ships, except the Vicksburg, joined
in the following communication, which was sent to Admiral
Uriu as soon as his position was made known:
"We consider that, in accordance with the recognized
rules of international law, the port of Chemulpo being a neu-
tral port, no country has the right to attack the vessels of
another power lying in that port, and that the power which
contravenes those laws is solely responsible for any loss of
life or damage to property in such a port. We accordingly
-protest energetically against such a violation of neutrality,
and we shall be happy to learn your decision on the sub-
ject." "'
' The Annual Register, 1904, page 375.
" International Law, as Interpreted During the Russo-Japanese
War, by F. E. Smith and N. W. Sibley, page i14.
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This protest, while vigorous, was ineffectual. The Rus-
sian ships were forced out on the 9th, and after fighting
gamely for over an hour against a greatly superior force they
returned to port badly damaged by shell fire and crowded
with wounded and dying.
Assistance was immediately given to them by all of the
foreign war vessels in the harbor, who took off their crews,
including those who were wounded and those who were not.
Subsequently the Russians returned in rowboats belonging
to the neutrals and set fire to and blew up their own ships.
A demand made by the Japanese Admiral for the men so res-
cued was refused by the neutral commanders, and eventually
the survivors of the Russian crews were put ashore in Rus-
sian territory outside the zone of hostilities.
Now three questions are presented by the events just nar-
rated, namely:
Did the Japanese violate the neutrality of Korea?
Was the protest of the captains justified?
Did the foreign commanders exceed their rights as neu-
trals in rescuing and liberating the Russian crews?
These questions may be answered categorically. It is
quite clear that Japan ignored the neutrality of Korea in
forcing the Russian ships from the harbor by means of
threats, and her defence is the same she has used so often
during the present struggle, that Korea was not an inde-
pendent neutral power, but in fact nothing more or less than
territory in dispute between the belligerents subject to an in-
effective and fictional government. As has been previously
observed there is much truth in such statements, but Japan
is estopped from alleging them by the very fact that part of
her casus belli was Russia's refusal to guarantee the terri-
torial integrity of China and Korea. To admit her defence
in this instance is to deny her sincerity in taking up arms.
With regard to the captains' protest it is hard to see upon
what legal principle it was based, though it is easily explain-
able upon motives of humanity. The only parties involved
in the threatened breach of neutrality were the belligerents
and the nation of Korea. The interests of the captains'
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countries were in no way affected, and it would seem that
they had no more right to intervene than a stranger to a con-
tract in a suit between the promisor and promisee.
The third question is especially interesting because it
raises a point which was considered with unusual care, but
without definite result by The Hague Conference; that is to
say, the responsibility of neutral rescuers of disabled belli-
gerents.
This problem was not definitely solved, the nearest the
Conference came to doing so was in "Article 6" of "The
Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864,"
which reads as follows:
" Neutral merchantmen, yachts, or vessels having or tak-
ing on board sick, wounded, or shipwrecked of the belliger-
ents, cannot be captured for so doing, but they shall be liable
to capture for any violation of neutrality which they may
have committed." 57
The following additional articles were proposed to the
Conference by Captain Mahan of the United States delega-
tion, but they failed of adoption; in fact, Captain Mahan
withdrew them:
" I. In the case of neutral vessels of any kind, hospital
ships, or others, being on the scene of a naval engagement,
which may as an act of humanity save men in peril from
drowning from the results of the engagement, such neutral
vessels shall not be considered as having violated their neu-
trality by that fact alone. They will, however, in so doing,
act at their own risk and peril.
"2. Men thus rescued shall not be considered under the
cover of a neutral flag, in case a demand for their surrender
is made by a ship of war of either belligerent. They are
open thus to capture or recapture. If such demand is made,
the men so rescued must be given up, and shall then have
the same status as if they had not been under a neutral flag.
"? The Peace Conference, at The Hague, Holls, page 126.
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" 3. In case no such demand is made by a belligerent
ship, the men so rescued having been delivered from the con-
sequences of the fight by neutral interposition, are to be con-
sidered hors de combat, not to serve for the rest of the war
unless duly exchanged. The contracting governments en-
gage to prevent, as far as possible, such persons from serv-
ing until discharged." 8
It is easily seen that these articles reduce the act of rescue
to an orderly scheme, and while they render the rescued liable
to become prisoners of war upon demand, they give them a
good chance of escape under conditions which prevent their
continuing as a menace to the belligerent which has disabled
them.
It certainly seems that the foreign captains at Chemulpo
rendered more assistance to the Russians than their status as
neutrals permitted, but on the other hand, the lack of definite
international regulations covering their actions was unques-
tionably the reason why they pursued the course above men-
tioned.
The next Conference should decide definitely how far a
neutral may go in succoring a belligerent, and what the neu-
tral's responsibility is to the other belligerent for preventing
the return .of those rescued to their nation's military strength.
It is hardly fair that when one belligerent disables the fight-
ing units of its adversary, they should return to the fray as
the direct result of the intervention of a neutral power, and
it matters not that such intervention is inspired by humane
motives. 9
During the night of August I ith and 12th, 1904, occurred,
what has been termed, the "cutting out" by the Japanese of
the Russian torpedo-boat Reshitelni. This vessel, under the
command of Lieutenant Rostachakovski of the Russian
Navy, had been sent from Port Arthur with dispatches, and
reaching the Chinese port of Chefoo on August I ith, she had
"The Peace Conference, Holls, page 504.
In this connection, see Art. x of the Second Convention (In re.
Maritime Warfare), agreed to at The Hague Conference, Wheaton,
page 477.
THE WAR IN THE ORIENT.
been placed by her commander under the orders of Admiral
Sah, the ranking officer of the Chinese Navy at Chefoo. It
is alleged, with apparent truth, that she had disarmed and
that her engines had been disabled.
Shortly after the arrival of the Reshitelni the Japanese
destroyers, Asashio and Kasumi, appeared off the port, and
after lying there during the day they entered in the even-
ing, and in spite of the commands and protests of Admiral
Sah they boarded the Russian ship, and, after some resist-
ance on the part of her crew and an unsuccessful attempt
to blow her up, they gained possession and left the harbor
with the Reshitelni in tow."0
Now there is no doubt that the action of Japan in this in-
stance was prima facie a gross breach of China's neutrality.
It is hornbook law that warlike operations cannot be
carried on within the territorial waters of a neutral
power."' But just here comes the crux of the case. Japan
contends that China was incapable of maintaining her neu-
trality, and that in order to prevent Russia from using Chi-
nese territory for purposes of recruiting, rest and repair,
she was obliged to interfere in a way which was in appear-
ance, though not in fact, contrary to the rules of inter-
national law."2 Japan argues that in the case of Chefoo,
China had winked for months at Russia's "wireless " sta-
tion, which we dealt with in a previous article. 3
On the other hand, it appears that China was never given
a chance to enforce her neutral powers towards the
Reshitelni. That vessel seems to have endeavored to com-
ply with every rule relating to internment, and if the Japan-
ese commander had any doubts about it, it was obviously his
duty to call upon Admiral Sah to enforce the law, rather than
to take matters into his own hands and violate the spirit and
" International Law, Smith and Sibley, page i6 et seq.Wheaton, page 578.
War and Neutrality, Lawrence, chap. x., page 2o2 et seq. It is
interesting to compare the facts in question with our own action
in the famous 'Florida case,' as to which, see Wheaton, page 58i." American Law Register, vol. 53, No. ii, page 695.
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letter of one rule in an alleged attempt to uphold another.'
Japan should not have assumed China's inability to maintain
her neutrality.
Regard it as we may, we can hardly see anything in the
facts to make the course of the Japanese anything more or
less than a gross bre,.ch of the neutrality of China and an
illegal injury to both China and Russia. Such being the
case, it would seem that China has just and lawffil cause on
which to base a claim against Japan for infringing her rights
as a neutral and sovereign power.6 5
At an early stage of the war Russia found herself in a
peculiar and unenviable position with relation to her naval
strength. Thanks to the exertions of Admiral
Hons On the Togo, the Port Arthur fleet was either sunk,disabled or bottled up in the harbor; while the
Vladivostok squadron was too weak to act otherwise than as
a raiding force. So much for the ships in the Far East.
In Europe the situation was little better. The Mediter-
ranean fleet under Admiral Wirenius was at Jibuti, French
Somaliland; the Baltic fleet had not been concentrated or
prepared for its famous globe-encircling cruise; while the
warships in the Black Sea were effectually corked up there-
in by numerous treaty obligations."8
To relieve this situation Russia did three things, all of
which raised questions in international law.
Admiral Wirenius was ordered home via the Red Sea and
the Suez Canal.
Several vessels were sent through the Dardanelles as mer-
Eaton's International Law, page 97.
For an interesting account of this incident, see From Tokio
Through Manchuria, by Major Seaman, U. S. A., page 174 et seq.
Major Seaman there says: "It is only fair to say that it was the
general opinion in Chefoo, as it seems to have been elsewhere in
diplomatic circles, that the Japanese had committed a flagrant
breach of international law. It was accepted as true, everywhere,
that the Russian vessel was disarmed, and had complied absolutely,
with international requirements, in cases where a belligerent war-
ship visits a neutral port."
" War and Neutrality, Lawrence, page 113; International Law,
Smith & Sibley, page 4o; The Annual Register, 19o4, page 375
ct seq.
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chantmen, and subsequently fitted, armed and commissioned
as volunteer cruisers.
Finally, the Baltic fleet was made ready for sea through
almost superhuman exertion, and its long journey was only
performed by the aid of neutral coal obtained in many ports,
just as a telegram can only traverse a continent by means of
relay batteries which thickly dot its path.
To return to Admiral Wirenius, his homeward voyage
was marked by some very strange conduct on his part. He
did not leave Jibuti until thirty-six hours after he was told to
do so."' He then captured three neutral merchantmen laden
with coal for Japan while returning through the Red Sea."6
But the most serious thing he did from an international
standpoint was to use the Gulf of Suez as a cruising ground,
where for nearly a week he menaced all neutral shipping
approaching the Canal, and, as will readily be seen, his posi-
tion was of such a commanding nature that the commerce
of the. world was at his mercy; it was impossible to escape
Wirenius if one desired to traverse the Canal."9
Now the convention of 1888, which provides for the neu-
tralization of the Suez Canal, reads as follows: "Article I.
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in
time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of com-
merce or war without destinction of flag.
"Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in
any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time
of- war as in time of peace. The Canal shall never be sub-
jected to the exercise of the right of blockade . . .. The
High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act
of hostility, nor any act having for its object to 6bstruct the
free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal
and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of three
marine miles from those ports.3
70
'War and Neutrality, Lawrence, page 114-
"See note 67.
"Wheaton, page 315, where the legal status of the canal, is ex-
plained and commented on.
'T Wheaton, Appendix I, page 8o6.
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Thus it is clear that the Russian Admiral violated the
spirit, if not the letter, of the law. It is probable that he
hovered at a legal distance from the Canal approaches, but
still so close that he was in fact maintaining an effective
blockade. Obviously it will be necessary in the light of this
occurrence for the Powers to increase the extent of the neu-
tral waters adjoining the Canal, or in the next important war
we may see more serious results from a similar defiance of
international law.
Russia's action regarding the volunteer cruisers recalls
some interesting facts of history. Ever sinces the treaty of
1841 the principle of closing the Straits at the entrance of
the Black Sea to vessels of war has been maintained by the
concert of the Powers." This principle was confirmed by
the treaties of 1856,72 and subsequently by the London Con-
vention of 1871,*" and the Eighteenth Protocol of the Treaty
of Berlin, which was signed in I878."
As has been stated, the beginning of this war found
Russia with a fleet of warships in the Black Sea, which she
was allowed to keep there for police purposes, but with no
way of getting them out without contravening the above-
mentioned treaties.
In this predicament she resorted to deception. Taking
three swift auxiliary cruisers, the Smolensk, Petersburg and
Sevastopol, the Russians disguised them as merchantmen,
" International Law, Smith & Sibley, page 30.
"International Law, Smith & Sibley, page 31.
International Law, Smith & Sibley, page 32.
International Law, Smith & Sibley, page 33. See also Wheaton,
page 226, where the following occurs: "The Treaty of Berlifi,
contains no express mention of the Dardanelles, but in the Eigh-
teenth Protocol, Lord Salisbury, declared on behalf of England that,
'the obligations of Her Britannic *Majesty, relating to the closing
of the Straits, do not go further than an engagement with the Sul-
tan to respect in this matter, His Majesty's independent determina-
tion in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties.' The Plenipo-
tentiaries of Russia, declared in reply that, 'without being able
exactly to appreciate the meaning of Lord Salisbury's proposition,'
in their opinion, the principle of the closing of the Straits is an
European principle; and that existing stipulations are binding on
the part of all the powers, not only as regards the Sultan, but also
as regards all the Powers signatory to these transactions.' "
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and on July 6th and 7th, 19o4, sent them through the
Straits. The vessels flew the commercial flag of Russia,
and one at least was flying the Red Cross flag and painted
white to resemble a hospital ship.
No sooner, however, did these ships reach the open sea
than the sunlight glinted upon the shining barrels of their
guns, and from peaceful merchantmen they changed in a
twinkling into veritable greyhounds of the sea.7"
A few days after this metamorphosis (July 13th), the
Petersburg seized the British P. and 0. steamer Malacca
in the Red Sea. Although the Malacca was simply carry-
ing ammunition for an English garrison, the Russians took
her to Algiers as a prize, and did not release her until July
28th. 76
Of course, this incident was entirely irregular in itself,
and caused a great outcry in England, and it also directed
the attention of the Powers to the status of the captor and
her sister ships, and brought up the paramount question of
the inviolability of the Straits agreements.
It really seems incontrovertible that the passage of the
Straits by the .Russian vessels was in contravention of all
the treaties bearing upon the matter. The ships were men
of war in disguise at the time of the passage. It would
seem that Russia might legally have armed and commis-
sioned them at sea had they been bona fide merchantmen to
start with, but they were nothing of the kind.
England, indeed, has insisted strenuously that their true
status was that of privateers, and hence constituted a viola-
tion of the Declaration of Paris. Be that as it may, the
lesson which the incident as a whole bears for the world
is the importance of providing an adequate method in
all cases for enforcing an observance of treaty obligations,
and it shows how foolish it is to entrust such enforcement to
so vacillating and futile an agency as The Sublime Porte.
The long voyage of the Baltic fleet was chiefly memorable,
"The Annual Register, 19o4, page 3x7.
"International Law, Smith & Sibley, 41.
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from a legal standpoint, because it raised questions as to
duration of stay in neutral waters, supply of coal by neu-
trals to belligerents, repairs permissible in neutral ports, and
the effectiveness of arbitration.
In dealing with the various ways in which a neutral may
legally furnish assistance to a belligerent we are confronted
by the fact that there is a great divergence of opinion among
the nations with regard to the amount of assistance permissi-
ble.
England is the most powerful adherent of the narrow
view, while France is the foremost champion of the liberal
theory. We shall readily understand the position of Great
Britain on such matters if we note the following ingenuous
paragraph which recently appeared in an article entitled,
" Maritime Responsibilities in Time of War," by Lieutenant
Carlyon Bellairs, R. N. T Lieutenant Bellairs says: "It is
impossible to understand British views on international law
unless we keep ever before us the fact that naval supremacy
is the great object of all British policy. In 1904, Britain's
naval expenditure, according to a Parlimentary return, was
over $25,ooo,oo0 greater than that of France, Germany and
Russia combined. Success is assumed as an axiom; and
any law tending to limit the power of the strong navy as
opposed to the weak one would be regarded as an abridg-
ment of British sea power. It is true that a war with a
European Power may result in stalemate, but she can con-
sole herself with her security on the sea where her interests
lie; the obvious embarrassments of her opponents' position,
and with the philosophical maxim that 'he that endureth to
the end shall be saved.' When, in addition, we reflect that
Great Britain possesses in her Empire the extensive coast-
line of 42,900 miles, with a unique series of coaling stations
along every trade route in the world, we see at once that she
has not nearly the same need as her rivals to secure during
war any benevolent neutral assistance."
In accordance with the spirit displayed in the foregoing
"The North American Review, vol. i8i, No. 2, page 168.
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quotation, Great Britain refuses to allow belligerent war-
ships to stay in her ports longer than twenty-four hours, and
refuses to sell them more than enough coal to take them
fo the nearest neutral or national port, and insists further-
more that such coal shall be used only for navigation.
On the other hand, France and countries which like her
are not great colonial powers, permit belligerents while in
their ports to purchase supplies and make repairs which may
be necessary for "the subsistence of the crews and the safety
of the navigation." ,' Nor do they insist upon such rigid
rules with regard to the length of time a belligerent may stay
in their harbors. For instance, Admiral Rojestvensky
stayed at Kamranth Bay, French Cochin China, from
April i4 th to April 22d, 19o5, and, so it is alleged, coaled
and provisioned there. Now the query is pertinent, if there
is such a difference in the rules adhered to by 'Various na-
tions, what is really the law?
The answer is that there are only a few fundamental rules
of neutral conduct in such matters which may be regarded
as binding upon all nations, and that all minor regulations
are left to the discretion of the individual powers, with the
proviso that no discrimination shall be made as between
belligerents.
Hence the policy'of neutrals in such matters is entirely
governed by their own resources, and a country like Eng-
land which in time of war needs little or no neutral assist-
ance is sure to frame rules which will reduce such assist-
ance to the minimum, while a country such as France will
obviously pursue a contrary policy. It may be said here
that the United States seems to have followed England in
matters of this kind, although her own position and interest
seem to render an adherence to the French theory advisa-
ble.7"
"The North American Review, vol. 181, No. 2, page 176, where, a
French view of the subject is presented by M. Charles Dupuis.
"Eaton's International Law, page 98; Article by Hon. Hannis
Taylor, The North American Review, vol. I8i, No. 2, page 161
esp., page 165.
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As to the rules which all neutrals must observe they sim-
ply provide that there must be no warlike operations in neu-
tral ports, there must be no supplies of arms or munitions of
war furnished to belligerents, nor must their forces be re-
cruited upon neutral ground."0
The interesting questions as to the limitation of stay and
of supply of coal and provisions are within the discretion-
ary category just mentioned, and are far from settled. The
reason given for a strict limitation is, that a liberal ruling
results in indirectly assisting one belligerent to war upon
another.
The champions of the liberal view say, however, that such
assistance is by no means certain to help the belligerent in
carrying on the war, but is simply a sale to him of necessi-
ties of life, and if equal opportunities are given to each bel-
ligerent no injustice is done.8
The matter seems very arguable, and it would smack of
dogmatism to attempt to decide it.
In the case in point a great deal of assistance was unques-
tionably given to the Russian fleet, mostly from French
sources, and it is seemingly true that without such ex-
"The Principles of International Law, by T. J. Lawrence, page
5i8, et seq. See also Eaton's International Law, page 96.
'-In The North American Review, vol. i81, No. 2, at page
182, M. Dupuis says: "French, as compared with English doc-
trines, allow neutral States much greater liberty of action. They
leave them the option of permitting, or forbidding, certain acts,
which the English, are inclined to hold should be necessarily for-
forbidden. The French custom imposes many less restrictions
than the British. * * * France, throws her ports wide open
to belligrent warships; she does not limit the length of their stay;
she only limits it to twenty-four hours, when they have entered
the port with prizes taken from the enemy. Warships, which have
sought refuge in a neutral port, to escape the enemy's pursuit, are
free to stay or to leave. If the enemy wishes to reduce them to a
state of impotence, it is for him to take the necessary measures to
make it dangerous for them to leave. Belligerent warships which
have entered a French port, may effect repairs there, or take in
stores necessary for navigation, or for the subsistence of their
crews; they may not, on the other hand, recruit combatants, or
provide themselves with arms, munitions, or articles for use in
action. Their stay in a neutral port, may, therefore, allow them
to leave it with fresh means of navigation, but not with any
increase of fighting strength." See also Wheaton, page 587.
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traneous aid it would never have been able to complete its
long voyage and engage in the terrible battle of the Korean
Straits. There is no question that Germany would be
guilty of a breach of neutrality, should she allow a Russian
army to march across her territory to invade France, and it
is a nice problem whether, after all, the French treatment
of the Baltic fleet does not differ merely in degree from such
conduct.
Brief notice may be taken of the famous "North Sea In-
cident" which occurred early in the voyage of the ill-starred
Baltic fleet. The facts are sufficiently well known, and re-
quire little discussion. Some English trawlers in the North
Sea were fired upon by the Russians during the night of Oc-
tober 21st and 22d, 19o4, with the result that severaf fisher-
men were killed and wounded, and one vessel was sunk.
The Russians mistook the fishing boats for Japanese de-
stroyers. "
The interest of the incident in international law arises
simply from its disposition. Despite a popular outcry in
Britain, which a few years ago would have in all probabil-
ity resulted in immediate war, the government maintained
its poise, and the matter was settled by arbitration under the
provisions of Articles 9 to 14 of The Hague Convention of
189983
The report of the Arbitral Commission provided for
proper compensation to the sufferers, and dealt with the
offence in diploniatic terms, which, while they did not seem
as severe as the occasion required, still had the effect of re-
storing nearly normal relations between the parties to the
controversy.
The incident as a whole may well be regarded as a tri-
umph for the cause of international peace.
There are one or two other matters which may properly
be considered under naval operations on the high seas, and
'The Annual Register, 19o4, pages 22r and 316.
'The Law Magazine and Review, vol. xxx, No. 335, page 203;
The Hague Conference, Holls, pages 2o3-22; International Law,
Smith & Sibley, pages 288 and 452.
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foremost among these is the sinking of the British steamer,
Knight Commander, by the Vladivostok squadron on July
24 th, 1904, off Idzu. The vessel was laden with alleged
contraband railroad material, and the Russians claimed
that they could not spare a prize crew, were themselves in
imminent danger of capture, and had no time to take their
prize to port for adjudication."'
This occurrence raised the question discussed in the begin-
ning of this article in its most acute form, for here it was a
matter not between the belligerents alone, but between a bel-
ligerent and a neutral. English authorities have contended
that under no circumstances could Russia's action in this
case be justified, and such a contention is in line with the
British policy above mentioned, for, in case of war, England
would never be so far from her own ports as to render a
similar act a necessity. However, it seems that if a nation
is willing to make ample reparation in case she makes a mis-
take as to the character of the cargo, destination, etc., there
is no valid reason why she should not in extreme cases sink
a neutral ship carrying contraband. She has to choose be-
tween allowing munitions of war to proceed to her adver-
sary's assistance or running great risk of naving her own
ships captured in taking them to port for adjudication. In
this dilemma sinking the contraband seems to be the only
way of cutting the Gordian knot, and in such a case the neu-
tral nation has no right to take offence, since it is univer-
sally acknowledged that ships, carrying contraband, trade at
their peril. Of course, wherever possible a prize should be
taken to port and given the benefit of a trial, but in a clear
case under the above circumstances such action as Russia
took seems justifiable.
Several times during the war the belligerents searched the
mail steamers of neutral powers, and while these actions
seemed generally to be within the right of search enjoyed by
"The Annual Register, i9o4, pages 175 and 317; 'International
Law, Smith & Sibley, page 186; The Law Magazine and Review,
vol. xxx, No. 334. page 8o: Articles of Messrs. Taylor and Bellairs,
North American Review, vol. 181; No. 2, pages 168 and 171.
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belligerents upon the high sea,85 still it seems well to call
attention to the fact that the United States has for years
insisted that only in extreme cases is there any justification
for interfering with the mails of a neutral power."" This
policy is attributable to commercial interest, which demands
that a peculiar sanctity shall attach to the mails as the instru-
ments of trade the world over.
There has probably never been a war in which sub-
marine mines played so important a part. Their value as
destructive agents was amply demonstrated be-
n -nes- fore the conflict was .a month old. The sinking
Reguation of such powerful vessels as the Petropavlosk
and the Hatsuse with hundreds on board, not
to speak of many less serious catastrophes, showed plainly
the terrible power of these unseen foes." ' But the most
serious feature of the situation was in relation to neutral
ships.
Unquestionably these mines are legal instruments of war-
fare so long as they are confined to territorial waters; that
is, so long as they are moored within three miles of the shore,
but it seems indisputable that in this War mines 'were em-
ployed much farther out. Many were found floating at
large far out in the Gulf of Pechili ,,ponstituting a hor-
rible menace to innocent and unoffending merchantmen."8
It is clear, then, that immediate steps should be taken to
restrain mining operations in future contests within legal
' In Eaton's International Law, the following appears at page
128: "' The right of visiting and searching a merchant ship on the
seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be
the destination, is an incontestable right of the lawfully com-
missioned cruisers of a belligerent nation # * * because till
they are visited and searched, it does not appear what the ships,
or the cargoes, or the destination are, and it is for the' purpose of
ascertaining these facts that the necessity of this right of visita-
tion and search exists." (Sir W. Scott)
" War andi Neutrality, Lawrence, pages 19o and I9i; see also
article by Commander von Uslar, North American Review, vol. x8r,
No. 2, page 186.
I The Annual Register, 1904, page 376.
"From Tokio Through Manchuria, by Major Seaman, chap.
vii.; Among Russian Mines in the Gulf of Pechili, at page io7.
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limits. But at this point we encounter a hot discussion as to
what those limits should be.
There are many who contend that while three miles was
a proper distance fifty years ago, yet to-day it is not far
enough because owing to the increased range of modem
guns a power holding the shore has gained control over at
least four more miles of his sea front than he formerly had.
On the other hand, if the limit of territoriality is increased
the danger to neutral commerce from mines and torpedoes
will be greatly increased with it. The question is a nice one,
and very difficult to determine, but it would seem that it
would be wise to increase the territorial limits subject to spe-
cial regulations affecting mines and torpedoes at a certain
distance from shore.89
Practically none of the interference with neutral vessels
which we have just discussed, would have occurred if the
A1t .- to belligerents had not suspected that the neutrals
trand were carrying contraband of war.
The word contraband has a meaning which is peculiar to
international law; it signifies articles or goods which are
clearly fitted by character or destination, or both, for use in
warfare by a belligerent state. The law allows the confiscA-
tion of such goods when captured by a belligerent, but it is
imperative that their contraband character shall be decided
wherever possible by a jrize court.
Modern international law has divided contraband into
two classes-namely, absolute and conditional. That is to
say, articles such as arms, powder, etc., about which there
can be no doubt are absolutely contraband, while such a
thing as railroad material, for instance, is only considered
contraband if its destination and other circumstances show
that it was in all probability intended to be used in warfare.
It is customary for each belligerent to state clearly at the
beginning of a war exactly what articles it will consider
'North American Review, vol. x81, No. z, page 184; International
Law, Smith & Sibley, pages 94-97; War and Neutrality, Lawrence,
pages 93-111.
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contraband, and this course was followed by both parties to
the conflict under discussion.
On February ioth, i9o4, the Japanese Government noti-
fied the powers as to the articles it would consider contra-
band, and this notification recognized the distinction above
alluded to between "absolute" and "conditional" contra-
band.
Absolute contraband was made to include "military
weapons, ammunition, explosives, and materials (including
lead, saltpetre, sulphur, etc.), and machinery for making
them, uniforms, naval and military, military accoutrements,
armour-plated machinery, and materials for the construc-
tion or equipment of ships of war."
Among goods, conditionally contraband, that is to say,
contraband if in all probability destined for military use,
were classed " provisions, drinks, horses, harness, fodder,
vehicles, coal, timber, coins, gold and silver bullion, and
materials for the construction of telegraphs, telephones and
railways.""
On the other hand, the "Rules which the Imperial Govern-
ment will enforce during the war with Japan," which were
issued by Russia February 28th, 19o4, made no distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband. Further-
more, they included as absolute contraband articles which
hitherto had not been regarded among the nations as even
conditionally so. The three most offensive clauses of the
"Rules " provided that the following should be considered as
absolutely contraband:
"8. Every kind of fuel, such as coal, naphtha, alcohol,
and other similar materials.
"9. Articles and material for the installation of tele-
graphs, telephones or for the construction of railroads.
" io. Generally, everything intended for warfare by sea
or land, as well as rice, provisions, and horses--beasts of
burden and others which may be used for a warlike purpose,
"Imperial Decree of Japanese Government, published February
zoth, 19o4.
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if they are transported on the account of, or are destined for
the enemy." "
These "Rules" were an entirely new departure in inter-
national law, and were met by vigorous protests from the
powers, notably Great Britain and the United States.
Secretary Hay, writing to Ambassador McCormick, on
August 3oth, 1904, regarding the capture and condemnation
of the American steamship Arabia, laden with flour for
Japan, thus tersely and forcibly stated the position of our
own government: "When war exists between powerful
states, it is vital to the legitimate maritime commerce of
neutral states that there be no relaxation of the rule-no
deviation from the criterion-for determining what consti-
tutes contraband of war, lawfully subject to belligerent cap-
ture; namely, warlike nature, use, and destination. Arti-
cles which, like arms and ammunition, are by their nature of
self-evident warlike use, are contraband of war if destined
to enemy territory; but articles which, like coal, cotton and
provisions, though of ordinarily innocent, are capable of
warlike use, are not subject to capture and confiscation un-
less shown by evidence to be actually destined for the mili-
tary or naval forces of a belligerent." 9
Not until September, 1904, did Russia recede in any way
from her extreme position, and then she only modified it by
an order which in effect recognized the status of provisions
as conditionally contraband.
Russia's action with regard to coal was absolutely incon-
" See Art vi. of the Rules, which the Imperial Government will
enforce during the war with Japan and Appendix II., to section, 14,
of the Instructions approved by the Admiralty Council, September
20, 1900.
"See Letter of Hon. John Hay to Hon. Robert S. McCormick,
dated August 3oth, i9o4; No. 143, Diplomatic correspondence with
U. S. Embassy in St. Petersburg. Published by Dept. of State.
See also on the general subject Wheaton pages 667-673; International
Law, Smith & Sibley, pages 194-257. Leading cases on International
Law, Pitt Cobbett, pages 311-333; Eaton's International Law,
pages io8-ii6; Lawrence on International Law, pages 598-623.
Sir Henry Maine, in his interesting Lectures on International Law
says: "From the very beginning of International Law, a bellig-
erent has been allowed to prevent a neutral from supplying his
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sistent with her position at the West African Conference of
1884-85, when she refused to admit that it was even condi-
tionally contraband."
By a supplement to the above-quoted rules, raw cotton
suitable for the manufacture of explosives, was added to the
list without regard to the fact that such cotton is just as suit-
able for purposes of peaceful manufacture."'
It is true that the fortune of war prevented the Russian
"Rules" from creating the international complications
which would naturally flow from their enforcement, but
nevertheless there is no question but that they constituted in
themselves a most serious breach of international law, and it
would seem that the powers would be justified in taking all
proper steps to avoid the repetition of such a brazen defiance
of the most fundamental rules relating to contraband of war.
enemy with things capable of being used immediately in war. Such
things are called technically ' contraband of war,' and may be con-
demned, independently of all question as to the neutrality of the
owner. The ship and cargo are taken into a port of the captor;
the contraband is condemned in a prize court, but the fate of the
ship itself varies. If the ship belongs to the owner of the contraband
or if the owner of the ship is privy to the carriage of the contra-
band, the ship is condemned, but not so, if the ship belongs to a
different owner, who knows nothing of the destination of the
contraband commodities. This brarich of International Law is
complex, and difficult, but it owes its intricacy and difficulty to
one special question: What, are the articles stigmatized as contra-
band? From the very first, Grotius, had laid down that, things
directly used in war-for example, weapons-were contraband. He
had also ruled that things useless in war, articles of luxury, as he
described them, were not contraband. But, outside these categories.
there were a great number of things capable of employment, both
in war and peace-rcs ancipitis usus-and it is in regard to these
that innumerable questions have arisen. Are articles- of naval
construction-for example, the raw materials of sails and cordage-
contraband? Do they become so at any particular stage of
manufacture? Are iron, brass, steel, etc., contraband? Are coals
and horses? Are provisions contraband? To these questions, all
sorts of answers have been given. In many special treaties, the
list of contraband and non-contraband commodities is given, and
the practice of States is extremely various. On the whole, the
most general rule which can be laid down, is that, with the excep-
tion of weapons, or munitions of war, the contraband or non-
contraband character of the cargo must depend on its destination,
and on the nature of the particular war which is going on."
"International Law, Lawrence, page 612; British State Papers,
Africa No. 4. (I885), pages 132. 133, 3.
"See Supplement to Russian War Rules, issued April 21st, 1904.
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Several such matters have been dealt with under previous
Qu.,t.ons of headings, and it is merely necessary to say a
ttenriment word about the Mandjur, and the squadron
of Admiral Enquist.
At the outbreak of hostilities the Russian gunboat
Mandjur was bottled up in Shanghai harbor by the Japanese
cruiser Akitsushima.
China, as she had a right to do, ordered the Mandjur to
depart in twenty-four hours, but the big Japanese cruiser
was in the offing, so the Russian refused to leave.
This was a breach of international law with regard to
China, but, as usual, she was too weak to enforce her neu-
trality. Japan might have taken this for a pretext to sail
in and force a fight, as she did in the case of the Reshitelni.
However, she chose a more pacific course, and finally an
agreement for the internment of the Mandjur was arrived
at between all the parties. Internment, meaning in this, as
in all cases, disarming the ship and crew, and keeping them
at the place of internment till the end of the war.
The incident was simply another evidence of China's in-
ability to assert her rights as a sovereign power."
The case of Admiral Enquist was peculiar. On June
9th, I9O5, he turned up with three cruisers, battered surviv-
ors of bloody Tsushima, in Manila harbor, and asked for
permission to make repairs and then sail for home.
Permission to do so was denied him, however, on the
ground that his injuries had resulted from warfare
and not from dangers of the sea. He was warned to
leave at once or intern, and chose the latter alternative."
It certainly seems upon authority that the distinction our
Government made as to the source of the injuries is a new
departure in international law.
The rule hitherto has been that a wounded belligerent ship
might make repairs in a neutral port, and was exempt from
the usual requirement of departure within twenty-four hours.
" War and Neutrality, Lawrence, page 137; Wheaton, page S62,
on the subject of Internment.
" North American Review, vol. xx, No. 2, pages 165, i8o.
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True it is that our new rule may be merely a port regula-
tion, and therefore perfectly legal, for we can make these at
will so long as they apply equally to all belligerents. But
it is submitted that our action was unwise in view of the
fact that we are not a great colonial power like England, and
some time we may be confronted with our own "rule"
when our ships are seeking asylum in distant seas.
In conclusion, it may be said that the present war has been
Con uslan an inestimable boon to international law, and
will in all probability make for general peace.
The question it has raised, some of which we have
briefly touched upon, demand adequate solution, and that at
no distant day.
A new Hague Conference is an absolute necessity in the
light of recent events, and let us hope that success may attend
its deliberations, and that it may have the unseen guidance
of Him who is not only the God of Battles, but also the God
of Love.
Theodore I. Grayson.
